Claire Zhao
Associate, Business Advisory Services
Washington, DC
Associate, Business Advisory Services
Washington, DC
Claire Zhao is a business advisory services associate at the US-China Business Council. Prior to joining the Council, she interned at the energy security and climate change program with the Center for Strategic and International Studies. She also served as a student consultant for the Bureau of Energy Resources, focusing on critical mineral supply chains and clean energy technology issues. Claire holds a master’s degree in International Relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a dual bachelor’s degree in Quantitative Economics and Global Studies from the University of California, Los Angeles. She is a native speaker of Mandarin.
Just six days after issuing the Regulations on Industrial and Supply Chain Security (Doc. 834), China’s State Council released the Regulations on Countering Foreign States’ Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction (Doc. 835), another expansion of Beijing’s retaliatory toolkit. Unlike Doc. 834, which governs sectoral and commercial supply chain security and is triggered by a demonstrable harm or threat, Doc. 835 targets foreign legal pressure itself regardless of commercial impact and can therefore be invoked under a lower evidentiary threshold.
China’s 15th five-year plan (FYP) suggests that industrial policy is no longer just one policy area among many but rather an organizing logic for the whole economy. Beijing is increasingly aligning domestic substitution, enterprise innovation, anti-involution, and infrastructure development around the goal of building a more self-reliant industrial system.
On March 5, Premier Li Qiang presented the 2026 Government Work Report at the opening of the annual Two Sessions in Beijing, setting a comprehensive slate of economic and development tasks for the year. The report was released alongside a draft outline of the 15th five-year plan (FYP), which will guide economic policy through 2030.
With several high-stakes engagements slated for next year — an April visit to Beijing by Trump, APEC in Shenzhen in November, the G20 in Miami in December, and a potential reciprocal state visit by Xi — neither side will seek to intentionally rock the boat. But the absence of a formal agreement, combined with pressure from parts of the US government that are concerned China policy is heading in the wrong direction, means the truce is fragile.
The United States and China have pulled back from a full-blown export control crisis after a presidential summit on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit last month. According to both sides’ readouts, they agreed to a one-year, reciprocal truce: the United States will suspend its “50% Rule,” which extended export restrictions to over 20,000 Chinese entities, and in exchange, China will suspend the rare earth element (REE) export control measures announced by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) on October 9.