Research & Analysis

Just six days after issuing the Regulations on Industrial and Supply Chain Security (Doc. 834), China’s State Council released the Regulations on Countering Foreign States’ Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction (Doc. 835), another expansion of Beijing’s retaliatory toolkit. Unlike Doc. 834, which governs sectoral and commercial supply chain security and is triggered by a demonstrable harm or threat, Doc. 835 targets foreign legal pressure itself regardless of commercial impact and can therefore be invoked under a lower evidentiary threshold.

In a pivot toward greater flexibility for public healthcare institutions, central government regulators recently introduced a series of measures to provide patients with differentiated, tiered products and services based on factors like clinical value, patient segmentation, and local fiscal capacity. The shift incentivizes innovation by driving more promising returns on R&D investments.

According to official government data, China’s real GDP grew 5% year-on-year in the first three months of 2026 to 33.42 trillion yuan ($4.9 trillion), beating expectations and reversing the downward trend seen in the second half of 2025. Strong industrial output and foreign trade drove growth, but weak demand weighed on overall activity and clouds the outlook for the rest of the year.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee on Wednesday advanced all 23 export controls related bills included in its markup, sending a strong message of support for enhanced controls and enforcement. Several bills, including the ADVERSARIES Act and STRIDE Act, passed unanimously, with most others receiving broad, bipartisan support.

China’s State Council issued the Regulations on Industrial Chain and Supply Chain Security on April 7, creating a mechanism to monitor and investigate supply chain risks. Investigations could lead to countermeasures against countries, companies, and other entities. While the rules don’t necessarily create new retaliatory tools, they connect China’s existing tools under one framework, embedding retaliation into China’s governance system.

This week, the United States and China affirmed that President Donald Trump’s visit to China is expected to go ahead despite mixed signals from the administration over China’s relationship with Iran. Trump on Tuesday met with US Ambassador to China David Perdue in Washington to discuss summit planning, but no details have been shared.

Speaking at the Hudson Institute on Tuesday, US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer outlined some of the key anticipated deliverables for President Donald Trump’s visit to China next month. Greer reaffirmed that the United States would push for a board of trade with China to identify non-sensitive sectors for bilateral trade.

US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer will not meet  his Chinese counterparts again ahead of President Donald Trump’s mid-May state visit to China. In an interview on Tuesday, Greer touted progress on agenda-setting for the trip during bilateral talks in Paris early last month, adding that communication was ongoing.

Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Guangdong remain the most mentioned locations for government engagement, unchanged from the past two years and underscoring the sustained economic vitality of the Yangtze River Delta and the Greater Bay Area. Shanghai leads in overall mentions, but Jiangsu surpassed the megacity when accounting for preference strength.

China’s 15th five-year plan (FYP) suggests that industrial policy is no longer just one policy area among many but rather an organizing logic for the whole economy. Beijing is increasingly aligning domestic substitution, enterprise innovation, anti-involution, and infrastructure development around the goal of building a more self-reliant industrial system.